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A PROBLEM IN INTERPRETATION
THOMAS P. HARDmAN
Perhaps few aspects of the judicial process are more puzzling,
to legal fundamentalists at least, than the technique of the courts
in dealing with the question of the extent, if any, to which the
so-called "plain meaning" of language in a written instrument
may be changed by construction. This is due, in no small part,
it is believed, to a tendency to look at only one element in the
judicial process - a tendency to look only at the legal rules (and
other legal precepts)' found in the decisions. Moreover, these
rules are apt to be read as if their meaning could be discovered
within their four corners alone, with perhaps the aid of a lexicon.
But courts do not confine themselves to a method of deciding cases
by precepts intrinsically interpreted and syllogistically applied.
Behind the approved phraseology, which courts are wont to re-
iterate under the doctrine of stare decisis, one may observe now
and again a mode of thinking, "a mode of treating legal prob-
lems", 2 which often gives new content to old precepts and which,
as a basis for "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact",
sometimes transcends in importance the role of form and syllogism.
To be sure, according to the official theory of the common law,
courts cannot and do not legislate, not even interstitially3 - all
new decisions are deduced syllogistically from existing precedents,
and this, according to the fundamentalists, with a sort of legal
Biblicism. But while a judge in writing an opinion may adhere,
in the foreground, as it were, to approved form, his integrated
* Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
'As to legal precepts other than legal rules, see Pou-ND, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY or LAW (1922) 115 et seq. As to legal elements other
than legal precepts, see Pound, The Ideal Element in American Judicial Deci.s-
ion (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 136; and Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of
Law (1933) 47 HA.Rv. L. Rnv. 1. The present writer has discussed these ele-
ments en passant in Public Utilities, The Quest for a Concept - Another
Word (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 230.
2 See PouiN, Tnn SPIRIT O' THE COMMON LAw (1921) 1. The significance
of the general mode of treating legal problems as distinguished from the lan-
guage of the courts (using language in its "normal" sense), is of course not
confined to cases involving problems in interpretation. Indeed, as Dean Pound
says, the common law in general "is essentially a mode of judicial and juristic
thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite
rules. " I Ibid.
3 Cf. Holmes, J. in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S. Ct.
524 (1917): "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legis-
late, but they can do so only interstitially: they are confined from molar to
molecular motions."
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word, like the word of others, may, in the perspective, "vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and
the time in which it is used."' 4  Mr. Justice Holmes, with that
felicity of phrase which set him apart and with that unexcelled
insight into the nature of law and the judicial process which hall-
marked his writings, has indicated this on more than one occasion.
In a telling page from his book on The Common Law he said :"
"The substance of the law at any given time pretty near-
ly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then under-
stood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the
degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend
very much upon its past."
First, then, as to the past. In the early law, as Wigmore has
so fully demonstrated that extensive discussion here would be un-
justifiable, the written word was sacred. It was, as he puts it,6
"a fixed symbol. Its meaning was something inherent and ob-
jective, not subjective and personal. A man who wrote a doc-
ument dealt with words as he might deal with a blunderbuss or a
carpenter's tool. They had their uses; and he must understand
and choose the proper word for the purpose in hand, just as he
must take the risk of not handling the gun or the adze in the
proper fashion."
Traces of this primitive theory can be found in the Roman
law. As one jurisconsult reasoned in the Digest: "non enim ex
opinionh'bus singulorum, sed ex communi usu nomina exaudiri
debere."' This theory obtained generally in Anglo-American law
till the 1800's and, in many courts, including our own court, is
still thought to be with us in the much-reiterated rule that the
normal meaning of words in a written instrument cannot be dis-
turbed by resort to interpretive evidence. In a leading West Vir-
4 " A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used." Holmes, J., in Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 38 S. Ct. 158 (1918).
5 HOAXES, TE Commox LAw (1881) 1-2.
6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2461.
7 "1Servius fatetur sententiam efs qui legaverit aspid oportere, in quam
rationem ea solitus sit referre: verura s! ea, de quibus non armbigeretur, auin
in alieno genere essent, ut puta escarium argentum aut paenu7as et togas, supel-
leatili quis adsoribere solitus sit, non idoirco existimari oportere supellectili
legata ea quoque continerl: non enim ex opinionibus singulorum, sed ex com-
nuni usu, nomina exaudiri debere." This and the following objection by
Tubero are from MommsE-, DiGESTA, XXXIII, 10, 7: "id Tubero parum sibi
liqutere ait: %am quorsum nomina, inquit, nisi ut demonstrarent voluntatem
dicentis? equidem non arbitror quemquam dicere, quod non sentiret, ut naiine
norino usus sit, quo id appolzari solet: nam vocis ininisterio utiur."
2
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ginia case, U-Nh v. Ohio River Railway Company,8 the court put
the rule thus:
"If a writing is not ambiguous, it must speak for itself
by its words, without aid of any oral evidence; but if it is
ambiguous, oral evidence is admissible to show the occasion
of the contract, the situation of the parties, the circumstances
surrounding them, their subsequent acts in executing the con-
tract, in order to show their intention in making it."
To this rule of construction the court added an exception
which for immediate purposes may be dismissed with a word. The
court continued: "but evidence cannot be received to show their
[the parties'] declarations, conversations or interlocutions before
or at the execution of the contract." Obviously this exception
refers to declarations of intention dealing with the subject of the
document, which, for reasons presently indicated, are admittedly
inadmissible, with certain limitations not coming within the pur-
view of this article.10 In this connection, however, it should be
noted in passing that the boundary between inadmissible "declara-
tions" of intention and "surrounding circumstances", including
language "circumstantially" evidencing intention, runs now and
again into a zone in which it is no longer possible to dichotomize
by a line of black or white - a zone in which the greying line of
distinction becomes one of degree. Nevertheless the line, or rather
zone, which is, in general, determined by the so-called parol
evidence rule, or rather by one part of the so-called parol evidence
rule,1 is discernible in numerous cases, and it is believed that
much of the confusion which exists in this field of law will dis-
appear if this distinction is borne in mind. One part of the
8 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340 (1902).
9 Point 1, syllabus.
10 As to these limitations, see WIG1IoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2471, 2472 ot seq. This
article is confined to a preliminary discussion of the interpretation of language
which is commonly referred to as having a "plain meaning." Only a treatise
could adequately cover all phases of the general problem. As to the alleged
distinction between "latent" and Cpatent"" ambiguities, see 2 WILLISTON,
CoNTRAcTs (1920) § 627: "Certainly so far as contracts are concerned, it
may be wholly disregarded. It was always and still is as Professor Thayer
has said, 'an unprofitable subtlety'." But see e. g., dictum in Collins v. Treat,
108 W. Va. 443, 152 S. E. 205 (1930), hereinafter discussed in the body of
this paper.
,1As to this, see WIGmORE, EVMENCE § 2471. Of course, as Wigmore points
out, "Iwhere the act is required by statute to be in written form - as, a will -
there is the additional reason that the oral utterance would fail to fulfil that
formality."
3
Hardman: A Problem in Interpretation
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
"parol evidence rule", which is really a rule of substantive law,12
provides, sufficiently for present purposes, that where the parties
to a transaction have integrated the terms of their jural act in a
single memorial, "all other utterances of the parties on that topic
are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are
the terms of their act."' 1  This part of the parol evidence rule
clearly precludes resort to declarations of intention dealing with
the subject of the document (with certain limitations beyond the
scope of this paper),1" but obviously, notwithstanding much
language to the contrary, does not exclude consideration of the
circumstances which tend to show the meaning of the terms used
by the parties.3 The question herein considered therefore boils
itself down to this: to what extent, if any, is extrinsic evidence
(exclusive of declarations of intention) admissible to give to words
in a written instrument a meaning other than the "normal" one?
On this question - the question of the admissibility of ex-
trinsic evidence, and the use which a court may make of it, for
the purpose, not of varying the terms of a written instrument,
but of construing the language found in the document - there
are two opposing theories, each supported, to a greater or less
degree, by West Virginia cases, by cases in other jurisdictions and
by text-writers. Of the first theory, which may be called the
"ambiguity rule", the above quoted statement from the West
Virginia case of Uhl v. Ohio River Railway Company'0 is typical.
In adopting this theory the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts said :17
"It is settled that the normal meaning of language in a
written instrument no more can be changed by construction
than it can be contradicted directly by an avowedly incon-
sistent agreement, on the strength of talk of the parties at
the time when the instrument was signed. "s
12 See, e.g., Mears v. Smith, 199 Mass. 319, 85 N. E. 165 (1908); Higgs v.
de Maziroff, 263 N. Y. 473, 189 N. E. 555 (1934); WIGoRE, EVIDENCE § 2425.
But see Leckie v. Bray, 91 W. Va. 456, 113 S. E. 746 (1922): "mere rule of
evidence"; JoNEs, EVMENCE (3d ed. 1924) § 434. Cf. C. T. McCormick, The
Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 365.
13 See WIGmoRE, EVMENCE § 2425.
14 See notes 10, 11, supra-
13 WIGM oRE, EviDENCE, has completely covered this point. See particularly
§§ 2400, 2401, 2425, 2426, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2470, 2471.
16 Supra n. 8.
7 TViolette v. Rice, 173 Mass. 82, 53 N. E. 144 (1899).
1s Cf. Goode v. Riley,'153 Mass. 585, 28 N. E. 228 (1891): "you cannot
prove a mere private convention between the two parties to give language a
4
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Holmes, who wrote this opinion, elaborated his ideas, in what
is perhaps the classical exposition of the subject, in an article in
the Harvard Law Review entitled "The Theory of Legal Inter-
pretation".1 9 He there said:
"How is it when you admit evidence of circumstances
and read the document in the light of them? Is this trying
to discover the particular intent of the individual, to get into
his mind and to bend what he said to what he wanted? No
one would contend that such a process should be carried very
far, but, as it seems to me, we do not take a step in that direc-
tion .... we ask, not what this man meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of Eng-
lish, using them in the circumstances in which they were used,
and it is to the end of answering this last question that we let
in evidence as to what the circumstances were. But the
normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a liter-
ary form, so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man.
He is external to the particular writer, and a reference to
him as the criterion is simply another instance of the ex-
ternality of the law." (Italics supplied.)
But in problems of interpretation is the normal speaker of
English, rather than the particular speaker, the criterion? As
already indicated, there is a square split of authorities on the
question. In Bank v. Catzen, ° the West Virginia court repudiated,
in part at least, the ambiguity rule enunciated in the Uhl case, "1
though the court did not cite the Uhl case. In the Catzen case the
court said (point 1 of the syllabus) :
"In deeds, contracts and other instruments, both techni-
cal and non-technical words are sometimes given meaning
variant from the significations they ordinarily have, and,
when it is manifest that the parties intended them to have a
restricted or peculiar signification, such intention will be re-
spected and enforced by the courts."
In support of this unorthodox statement in the syllabus the
court used the following language in the body of its opinion :22
different meaning from its common one .. . It would open too great risks
if evidence were admissible to show that when they said five hundred feet they
agreed it should mean one hundred inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument
should signify the Old South Church." Such a private convention, being a
"declaration of intention," is generally excluded by the parol evidence rule.
As to exceptions, see WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2462, 2463, and Marmet Co. v.
Archibald, 37 W. Va. 778, 778, 17 S. E. 299 (1893).
1 (1899) 12 HAv. L. REv. 417.
2o 63 W. Va. 535, 60 S. E. 499 (1908).
21 Supra n. 8.
22 At p. 539.
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"That technical terms are not, and need not, always be
used by the parties to a contract in their technical sense, is
very well settled by the authorities. Like non-technical words,
they sometimes have peculiar meaning, ascertained by refer-
ence to the subject matter, the situation and purposes of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances."
It is true that in another point of the syllabus and in another
part of the opinion the court, adhering to form, pays a certain
amount of lip-service to the ambiguity rule, but this language,
being unnecessary to the decision in the case, is not authoritative.
The substance of the law of the case is indicated in the following
excerpt :23
" .... the attempt to apply it [the language in question]
to the subject matter, a thing well known to the parties, and
therefore necessarily within their contemplation, shows that
it was never intended to have effect according to its literal
meaning.))
In support of the view sanctioned by the West Virginia court
in the Catzn case, Williston in his monumental work on Con-
tracts, 24 after pointing out -" that the normal standard as to the
meaning of language in a written agreement is not the correct
test, says:
". .... If the normal standard were the test, the rule
would properly be as it is still not infrequently stated that
only where the language is ambiguous on the face of the writ-
ing, can the circumstances under which the contract was made
be admitted.
"In regard to some of these statements, it may be guessed
that the court in denying the admissibility of evidence of
surrounding circumstances to vary the meaning of an appar-
ently clear writing, meant no more than that in the particular
case the evidence offered would not persuade any reasonable
man that the writing meant anything other than the normal
meaning of its words would indicate and that therefore it
was useless to hear the evidence. On the other hand, in many
cases where evidence of surrounding circumstances has been
admitted, the language of the contract in question, if given
its normal meaning, was in fact ambiguous, so that no neces-
sity arose for the court to decide whether admission of such
evidence is dependent upon ambiguity. The correct principle
has been well summarized in a recent decision. 'All the at-
23 At p. 539.
24 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 629.
25 Partly in § 618.
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tendant facts constituting the setting of a contract are ad-
missible, so long as they are helpful; the extent of their as-
sistance depends upon the different meanings which the
language itself will let in .... Yet, as all language will bear
some different meanings, some evidence is always admissible;
the line of exclusion depends on how far the words will stretch,
and how alien is the intent they are asked to include.' "
(Italics supplied.)
The recent decision from which Williston quotes is Eustis
Mining Co. v. Beer,28 opinion by Learned Hand, J. In a still
more recent case, In re Tidewater Coal Exchange,27 the same
learned jurist further explains what Williston claims to be the
"correct principle". Judge Hand there says :28
". ... it is always necessary to know what conduct the
parties had in mind when they used the words chosen for
the promise. Nor is there any limitation whatever on the
right of a court to hear any facts which will throw light on
what that conduct was. Wigmore, § 2470. It is indeed said
at times that if the meaning of the language is clear, no proof
is permissible to twist it from its usual sense. But that onlJ
means, as I understand it, that the words may be, too clear
to yield to the implications of any setting. It never means
to preclude the comparison between the usual meaning of
the words and their result under the circumstances. In short,
the question is never the proper use of language, but of what
future conduct the specific promise actually contemplated. If
it once plainly appear that the parties must have meant to
use words out of their normal meaning, that will be the measure
of the promise. All that can be said is that as matter of proof
a court should be slow to assume that they did not use their
words normally. There is, howeyer, no rule of law which con-
trols the admission of evidence of the surrounding facts, or
the use which a court shall make of it, as there is, for example,
touching contemporaneous declarations of intention. The
ancient statements of the books that a document must be read
within its four corners is [sic] no longer the law and has not
been for a century. Words must always be translated into
things or conduct, and they cannot be unless the setting is
in proof in which they are used." (Italics supplied.)
The view expounded by Williston is particularly important
in view of the fact that Williston, as Reporter for the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts for the American Law Institute has,
26 239 Fed. 976 (1917).
27 292 Fed. 225 (1923).
28 At p. 232.
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though in somewhat different language, incorporated his views in
the Restatement. However, for reasons hereinafter appearing,
the provisions of the Restatement on this point wil be set out
later.
In support of this view Wigmore, in his penetrating treatise
on Evidence, 29 says:
"The truth had finally to be recognized that words al-
ways need interpretation; that the process of interpretation
inherently and invariably means the ascertainment of the
association between words and external objects; and that this
makes inevitable a free resort to extrinsic matters for apply-
ing and enforcing the document. 'Words must be translated
into things and facts.' Instead of the fallacious notion that
'there should be interpretation only when it is needed,' the
fact is that there must always be interpretation. Perhaps
the range of search need not be extensive, and perhaps the
application of the document will be apparent at the first view;
but there must always be a travelling out of the document, a
comparison of its words with people and things. The deed
must be applied 'physically to the ground' . . . Once freed
from the primitive formalism which views the document as a
self-contained and self-operative formula, we can fully appre-
ciate the modern principle that the words of a document are
never anything but indices to extrinsic things, and that there-
fore all the circumstances must be considered which go to
make clear the sense of the words . .. ."
It is interesting to note that the last quotation in this passage
is from an opinion by the West Virginia court in Anderson v.
Jarrett,3 0 opinion by Brannon, J. Cases supporting this view are
numerous.31 See, for example, the rather recent decision by the
United States Supreme Court in International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty,32 in which the court in holding, by the aid of extrinsic
evidence, that a word was not to be given its normal meaning, said:
"Words are flexible."
An excellent illustration of this view is a leading decision by
the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Insurance Company.33
There an insurance policy on a ship contained this clause: "the
risk to be suspended while vessel is at Baker's Island loading".
Though this phrase is quite unambiguous, the court said :3'
2 9 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2470.
so 43 W. Va. 246, 27 S. E. 348 (1897).
31 See, collecting some of the cases, WIISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 629, 630.
32272 U. S. 50, 47 S. Ct. 19 (1926). See also Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281
U. S. 635, 50 S. Ct. 440 (1930).
33 95 U. S. 23, 9 S. Ct. 206 (1877).
34At p. 30.
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"This case .... turns upon the point whether the clause
means, while the vessel is at Baker's Island for the purpose
of loading, or while it is at said island actually loading. If
it means the former, the company is not liable; if the latter,
it is liable.
"A strictly literal construction would favor the latter
meaning. But a rigid adherence to the letter often leads to
erroneous results, and misinterprets the meaning of the parties.
That such was not the sense in which the parties in this case
used the words in question is manifest, we think, from all the
circumstances of the case."
This case is particularly in point for the reason that the
United States Supreme Court, in the teeth of an "unambiguous"
provision, let the surrounding circumstances in to show the pur-
pose for which the contract was created, and held that in the
light of this evidence the words had a meaning other than the so-
called "plain meaning".
In the main, then, it may be said that the better out-of-state
authorities favor the so-called modern rule. In West Virginia,
however, it is difficult to generalize broadly. Uhl v. Ohio River
Railway Company,35 already quoted from, is one of several cases
that require one to look at more than the language technique of
the court. In that case one Uhl entered into a written agreement
conveying to a railroad company a "right of way of the width of
fifty feet .... in, upon and through the lands of the said Uhl
.... And the said Uhl also hereby covenants and agrees to ex-
ecute .... a deed conveying to the said company in fee simple
the land hereinbefore described." The question raised was
whether the words "right of way" etc. conveyed a fee simple or
an easement. The court said: 36 "This agreement is not, in a legal
point of view, ambiguous . . . . But", said the court, "suppose
we could say that the instrument is ambiguous. When we place
ourselves in the situation of the parties, and reflect that they met
only to contract for a right of way, that such was the sole design
of the company, that the paper so declares on its face, that such
was the moving purpose, that the company did not dream of ac-
quiring oil, or of using the land in the oil business, we cannot
hesitate for a moment to conclude that merely a right of way was
in the contemplation of the parties. We need no oral evidence
for this [i. e., to prove what the court holds] ; the writing itself
so speaks." The case can hardly be said to hold that extrinsic
35 Supra n. 8.
36 At pp. 109, 112.
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evidence is inadmissible because the agreement is unambiguous,
for the court in fact considered the extrinsic evidence and said,
in effect, that by intrinsic interpretation or by extrinsic interpre-
tation the agreement meant the same thing. The court, however,
relying on an earlier case, also said :"
"This controversy thus calls for the construction of said
agreement. If a written contract is not ambiguous, it speaks
for itself, and courts must carry its written words into effect;
but if it is ambiguous, we may consider the circumstances
surrounding the parties at the time they executed it, their
situation, the nature of the contraot which they were making
as to its purpose, in order to enablb us to say what that situa-
tion or occasion called for, what was their intention, so that
we glean the intention of the parties, as that actual intention
is the criterion, the key to unlock the meaning of the contract.
Knowlton v. Campbell, 37 S. E. 581, 48 W. Va. 294."
It would seem therefore that what the court indicated in the
Ul case with reference to the inadmissibility of evidence when an
agreement is not ambiguous is little more than reiterated form,
born of a tendency to quote. Moreover, it is believed that the
Knowlton case, which the court relies upon in the UhZ case for
the above-quoted ambiguity rule, contains nothing more than a
dictum on this point. That case involved a written lease having
to do with the payment of rental "until work is commenced".
At the trial the plaintiffs were allowed to ask Knowlton this ques-
tion: "State what the bargain or agreement was in relation to the
paying of rental by Mr. Campbell to you upon the lease." Knowl-
ton answered: "The agreement was that the rental was to be paid
to me until the well was completed, while that paper there says
until work was commenced, and I supposed that that was the way
it was written in the lease, rental to be paid until the Well was
completed." The court said that "the case turns upon the ques-
tion whether that oral evidence was properly admitted over the
defendant's objection." It is quite clear that the evidence offered
is inadmissible for the reason that, being in final analysis a
declaration of intention dealing with the subject of the document,
it violates the parol evidence rule. Nevertheless the court, both
in its opinion and in the syllabus, talks in terms of the ambiguity
rule. It would seem therefore that what the court said in that
case on the question of construction, though appearing in the
37 At p. 109.
10
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syllabus, was unnecessary to the decision and therefore mere
dictum.
Lest it be contended that the reasoning herein adopted does
violence to the oft-invoked doctrine that the syllabus is the law
of the case in West Virginia, perhaps it is worth while to point
out, parenthetically, that the West Virginia statute,88 and the
West Virginia Constitution,39 merely state in this regard that "it
shall be the duty of the court to prepare a syllabus of the points
adjudicated in each case." The statutory and constitutional pro-
vision does not say that everything that appears in the syllabus
is law or decision as distinguished from dictum, irrespective of
whether or not the facts in the case call for an expression of opin-
ion on the points stated in the syllabus. Nor does it say that
points adjudicated but not stated in the syllabus are not law. If
the syllabus is the law of the case in West Virginia, as the lan-
guage of the court sometimes indicates, it is pertinent to ask 'what
is the law of the case where, as in Long v. Potts, 0 the court
adjudicates a point, writes an opinion stating its reasons, but
does not write a syllabus. Furthermore, the court in deciding
cases constantly relies on the precepts and other legal elements
indicated in the opinions. Finally, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has recently declared in Henshaw v. Globe, etc. Insurance
Co.,41 that this constitutional and statutory provision is "direc-
tory" only.42 When all is said and done therefore the syllabus in
West Virginia is, in reality, merely an official headnote, a headnote
the language of which may be sanctioned by the court more fully
than the language of the opinion, but it is none the less, if one
looks at all the realities in the judicial process, merely an official
headnote behind which one must search, time and again, if one
would strike straight through form in order that he may discover
all the operative elements in the judicial process.
Similarly in most, if not all, of the more modern West Vir-
ginia cases in which the language of the ambiguity rule appears,
it is believed that the ambiguity rule is little more than reiterated
form and is not, by and large, the real element which can be used
as a basis for predicting what the court will do in fact in subse-
38 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 58, art. 5, § 21.
39 Art. 8, § 5.
40 70 W. Va. 719, 75 S. E. 62 (1912).
41112 W. Va. 556, 166 S. E. 15 (1932).
42 Cf. Homer v. Amick, 64 W. Va. 172, 61 S. E. 40 (1908).
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quent cases. A few of the later West Virginia decisions in which
such language is used will, it is believed , suffice to illustrate.
In Collins v. Treat,48 decided in 1930, there was a written
lease between William J. Collins and others containing the clause:
"the said parties of the first part to receive one-eighth of the net
proceeds ... ." With reference to the admissibility of evidence
for the alleged purpose of construing this language, the court
said :44
"The plaintiffs take the position that there is an ambigu-
ity in the contract .... and therefore it is proper for the
court to consider parol evidence in determining the intention
of the parties to the contract and particularly to show what
was William J. Collins' understanding of the meaning of the
phrase 'net proceeds', and what had been said to him about
the meaning of said phrase by one of the defendants after the
said contract had been drafted . . . and before it was
executed."
The evidence offered, inasmuch as it involves a declaration of
intention dealing with the subject of the document, clearly violates
the parol evidence rule. Therefore the point actually adjudicated
in the ease, namely, that the evidence was inadmissible, is quite
consistent with the modern view. In reaching this conclusion,
however, the court felt called upon to answer the plaintiff's con-
tention "that there is an ambiguity in the contract .... and there-
fore it is proper for the court to consider parol evidence in de-
termining the intention of the parties." In disposing of this con-
tention the court, after stating the ambiguity rule in the form
hereinbefore set forth, quoted from Uhl v. Railway Company"
and from Lewis v. Flour & Feed Company :46
" - . but evidence cannot be received to show their
[the parties'] declarations, conversations or interlocutions
before or at the execution of the contract.' " " 'The declara-
tions of the parties as to what they intended by the language
they used, are inadmissible.' Lewis v. Flour & Feed Co., 90
W. Va. 471."
The language from the Uhl case and from the Lewis case
sufficiently disposed of the plaintiff's contention in the Collins
case. It is important to note, however, that the ambiguity rule
43108 W. Va. 443, 152 S. E. 205 (1930).
44 At p. 446.
45 Supra n. 8.
40 90 W. Va. 471, 111 S. E. 158 (1922).
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therein set forth has nothing to do with the particular sort of
evidence there under consideration, and such evidence, since it
involved a declaration of intention dealing with the subject of the
document, is, according to all generally recognized authorities, in-
admissible because of the parol evidence rule. The language just
quoted governs the case. Hence, what the court says in the Col-
lins case about the ambiguity rule is, it would seem, dictum, not
decision. At any rate the conclusion reached by the court in the
Collins case is not only sound but also consistent with the modern
view.
In Ferimer v. Lewis, Hubbard & Company,47 decided by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1934, there was a
written agreement between R and the defendant, providing in
effect that collateral therein indicated was to secure the latter
"of a certain indebtedness, being an account for merchandise"
purchased by another. The defendant contended that the agree-
ment was ambiguous and could be construed as applying to a run-
ning account as consistently as to a specific purchase, and offered,
over objection, evidence that one X understood from an alleged
conversation had in his presence between R, a party to the agree-
ment, and the agent of another party to the agreement just prior
to the execution of the agreement, that a running account was
intended. The court held that this evidence was inadmissible, and
quite correctly, for, being a direct declaration of intention dealing
with the subject of the document, the testimony obviously violates
the parol evidence rule. The actual holding therefore does not
militate against the modern view. However, the court, partly
perhaps because the defendant contended that the agreement was
ambiguous, talks somewhat in terms of the approved language
technique. But this is believed to be dictum, partly for the reason
already indicated and partly for the reason that the court cites, in
support of its conclusion, "Williston, Contracts, sees. 618, 629",
which sections, as already seen, specifically support the modern
view.
In addition to the declaration of intention, certain surround-
ing circumstances were offered in evidence in the last-mentioned
case. As to these the court said that, if the contract is ambiguous,
surrounding circumstances are admissible to interpret it. There-
after the court, though regarding the writing as unambiguous,
said that "the surrounding circumstances and the language of the
47 114 W. Va. 629, 173 S. E. 264 (1934).
13
Hardman: A Problem in Interpretation
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
agreement harmonize", which would seem to show that, after all,
the court did consider the surrounding circumstances, i. e., did, in
fact, apply the modern rule.
The rather recent decision in Bragg v. Peytona Lumber Com-
pany, is one of the most important cases in point.4" In that case
there was a written contract providing, inter alia, that P was to
cut "poles . . . . to conform in every way to what is known as
Class 'B' of Chestnut Pole specifications". There were "stand-
ard" Class B Chestnut Pole specifications as understood in the
market generally, and these had certain minimum dimensions.
A question was whether evidence of former dealings between the
parties, including a former contract, as well as their acts subse-
quent to the execution of the contract, was admissible to explain
the sense in which the parties had used the phrase "poles .... to
conform in every way to what is known as Class 'B' " poles. The
court held that such evidence was admissible and that it showed
that the parties used the words to mean something other than
"standard" Class B poles as understood in the market generally.
The court said :49
...... In the light of prior dealings 'Class B' poles could
have meant, as between the contracting parties, something
quite different from the standard Class B poles as generally
understood by the commercial world. In such case the prac-
tical construction put upon it by the parties thereto is of great
weight . .. ."
Is the language in the written instrument in the Bragg case
ambiguous? The court intimates that it is. But the court also
says: "The standard Class B pole as recognized in the commercial
world is admittedly a pole of much larger dimensions than the
poles" which, according to the holding of the court, the parties
intended when they said in the written instrument that "the poles
are to conform in every way to what is known as Class 'B' " poles.
If, in the light of that, the agreement in the Bragg case is "am-
biguous", it would seem that the court is not using the word "am-
biguous" in its "normal" sense - that the court is, consciously
or unconsciously, putting new content into old precepts.
Speaking of what the courts may mean by such language as
that which appears in some of the West Virginia cases, Williston 0
says (to quote again) :
48102 W. Va. 587, 135 S. E. 841 (1926).
49 At p. 590.
o WILLs TON, CONTRACTS § 629.
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"In regard to some of these statements, it may be guessed
that the court in denying the admissibility of evidence of sur-
rounding circumstances to vary the meaning of an apparently
clear writing, meant no more than that in the particular case,
the evidence offered would not persuade any reasonable man
that the writing meant anything other than the normal mean-
ing of its words would indicate and that therefore it was use-
less to hear the evidence."
This diagnosis of the language technique of the courts that
sometimes talk in terms of an ambiguity rule is apparently true
as to Watson v. Buckhannon River Co.,51 a rather recent West
Virginia case, in which the court says (point 2 of the syllabus):
"The circumstances surrounding the parties at the time
of the making of a written contract may always be shown;
but where the writing is plain, definite and unambiguous it
cannot be varied by parol evidence showing facts which might
have the effect of changing the plain intent expressed by the
writing." (Italics supplied.)
This language involves an obvious inconsistency unless the talk
about the ambiguity rule means merely that, "where the writing
is plain, definite and unambiguous", such evidence, if let in, could
not be given effect because a reasonably intelligent person could
not, even in the light of the evidence, "stretch" the language in
question far enough to include the interpretation indicated by the
surrounding circumstances. Moreover, the opinion quotes with
approval from Williston, Contracts, § 618, which supports the
modern view. Though Williston's "guess" as to what courts
may mean by the ambiguity rule, when they talk in terms of such
a rule, does not, as hereinafter indicated, fit all West Virginia
cases, the utmost that can be said for the ambiguity rule in West
Virginia would seem to be that the West Virginia law on the
point is not clear. In such a situation it would seem that we may
safely rely upon the Restatement of the Law by the American
Law Institute as an authoritative guide in this jurisdiction,
especially since that view is supported by the best commentators
and, in fact, if not in language technique, by recent West Vir-
ginia eases that have not been overruled, and particularly since
the West Virginia court, in City of 'Wheeling v. Benwood-Mc-
Mechen Water Co., 52 has, quite recently, expressly sanctioned that
"195 W. Va. 164, 120 S. E. 390 (1923).
52 115 W. Va. 353, 176 S. E. 234 (1934).
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part of the Restatement which sets out the correct standard of
interpretation.
On this point, Sections 230 and 235 of the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts set forth two of the applicable rules, with com-
ment thereon, as follows:
"(d) All circumstances accompanying the transaction
may be taken into consideration, subject in case of integra-
tions [i. e., complete written contracts], to the qualifications
stated in § 230. [Section 230 reads as follows: 'The standard
of interpretation of an integration, except where it produces
an ambiguous result, or is excluded by a rule of law estab-
lishing a definite meaning, is the meaning that would be at-
tached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person
acquainted with all- operative usages and knowing all the cir-
cumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of
the integration, other than oral statements by the parties of
what they intended it to mean.']
"Comment on Clause (d):
"e. The court in interpreting words or other acts of the
parties puts itself in the position which they occupied at the
time the contract was made. In applying the appropriate
standard of interpretation even to an agreement that on its
face is free from ambiguity it is permissible to consider the
situation of the parties and the accompanying circumstances
at the time it was entered into - not for the purpose of
modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in
determining the meaning to be given to the agreement.
"f. . ... as all language will bear some different mean-
ings, evidence of surroundings is always admissible. Its
operative effect depends on how far the words will stretch,
and how alien from the ordinary meaning of the words is the
intent they are asked to include." (Italics supplied.)
It is clear from the Restatement that apart from "statements
by the parties of what they intended it [the integrated instrument]
to mean", or as Wigmore puts it, "declarations of intention deal-
ing with the subject of the document", there is no rule excluding
evidence for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of language
in a written instrument, the only limitation upon the use of the
evidence being whether the language in question will "stretch"
far enough to include the meaning contended for and whether the
intent wihch the writing is asked to include is, in the language of
the Comment on Section 242 of the Restatement, "completely
alien to anything its words can possibly express."
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It seems therefore that, subject to a caveat hereinafter con-
sidered, we may start with the proposition laid down by the West
Virginia court in Watson v. Buck7annon River Co." that "The
circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the making
of a written contract may always be shown" for the purpose of
ascertaining the meaning which the parties attached to the words
they used. To what extent, however, do these so-called "circum-
stances" include utterances of the parties themselves? On this
point, though there is some difference of opinion, the generally
accepted authority, including the Restatement, is reasonably clear.
Wigmore says:"
"It is worth while emphasizing that among the 'circum-
stances' to be investigated are included, not only the corporal
objects surrounding the party, but also his utterances, written
and oral, as applied to those objects.
"Among this latter class, liowever, there is one forbidden
variety, namely, expressions of intention dealing with the sub-
ject of the document."
The law on this point is stated as follows by the West Virginia
court in Redden v. Glade Creek Coal & Lumber Co.,' the court
quoting with approval from the Virginia case of Pine Beac h Co.
v. Columbia Amusement Co.:56
" 'If the previous negotiations make it manifest in what
sense the terms of the contract are used, such negotiations
may be resorted to as furnishing the best definition to be ap-
plied in ascertaining the intention of the parties. The sense
in which the parties understood and used the terms of the
contract is thus ascertained. To explain the meaning of a
writing in the true sense, and with this limit, is to develop the
real meaning of the document. The admission of parol
evidence for this purpose does not violate the rule which makes
the written instrument the proper and only evidence of the
agreement."
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts' 7 provides:
"Previous negotiations between parties to an integrated
agreement, whetlter the negotiations relate to that agreement
or to another, are admissible to show that the agreement has
53 Supra 31. 51.
f4 WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 2471.
55 105 W. Va. 138, 141 S. E. 639 (1928).
s6 106 Va. 810, 56 S. E. 822 (1907).
57 § 242.
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any meaning which is not impossible under the standard stated
in sec. 230, though that meaning would not otherwise have
been given to the agreement.
"Comment:
"a. Where the parties by the language they have em-
ployed leave their meaning obscure and uncertain when ap-
plied to the subject-matter, then the expressions and general
tenor of speech used in the previous negotiations, even if
coming as they usually must from one or the other of the
parties themselves, are admissible to show the conditions ex-
isting at the time when the writing was made. And even
where the writing is not ambiguous on its face, the circum-
stances under which the parties contract may be looked at to
establish an ambiguity; as well as to indicate the proper
choice of possible meanings; and the common knowledge and
the understanding of the parties themselves as shown by their
previous negotiations is sometimes such a circumstance. There
is, however, a limit to the application of the rule stated in
the Section. Previous negotiations cannot give to an in-
tegrated agreement a meaning completely alien to anything
its words can possibly express." (Italics supplied.)
The case of Alderson v. Gauley Fuel Co.,8 decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on February 19,
1935, may seem, at first blush, to be somewhat at variance with
the general proposition herein contended for. Point 1 of the
syllabus reads as follows:
"The rule of practical construction by act of the parties
applies only where the contract on its face is ambiguous and
uncertain, and not where by its terms the instrument ex-
presses their intention with reasonable certainty."
In that case a written lease providing for royalties contained
certain specific stipulations including one which provided that,
after the aggregate royalties paid amounted to $25,000, "the lessee
or its assigns shall be credited, without interest, by the lessors
with any minimum royalty which shall have been paid before the
commencement of operations by crediting the lessee or its assigns
in each quarter thereafter with one-half the royalty due for
said quarter . . ." By intrinsic interpretation the court first
held that the stipulations meant that the lessee was "entitled to
credit for one-half of all the rental payments made" after the
royalties paid totalled $25,000. Having come to this conclusion
the court thereupon dealt with a contention that "by making pay-
58 178 S. E. 626 (W. Va. 1935).
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ment of the full quarterly rental after the aggregate of rentals
paid had reached the sum of $25,000, the defendant [lessee] had
placed a practical construction upon the provisions of the
lease .... ." Answering this contention the court said:19 " ... . in
the case at bar the contract itself expresses the intention of the
parties with reasonable certainty, and in that case the rule sought
to be invoked does not apply."
The actual conclusion reached in the Alderson case is quite
consistent with the modern view adopted by the Restatement, for
the language used in the writing in that case is so specific - so
detailed in its specific provisions - that it falls within the above-
quoted limitation put by the Restatement and by the cases upon
the use *of practical construction, viz., the meaning evidenced by
the conduct of the parties subsequent to a manifestation of inten-
tion must, to be adopted, be such a meaning that "a reasonable
person could attach it to the manifestation". In the Alderson
case a reasonable person could not attach to the written agree-
ment, so specific in its details, the meaning rather weakly
evidenced by the practical construction. In other words the
language there in question will not "stretch" far enough to in-
clude the interpretation so evidenced by the subsequent conduct
of the parties.
It must be admitted, however, as hereinbefore intimated, that
it is not every West Virginia case that can be fitted completely
into the modern view. And one case that stands out so con-
spicuously that it can hardly be passed by without a word is
Griffin v. Coal Company,"0 decided by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1905. In that case a deed purported to con-
vey the coal under certain land, "together with the right to ....
mine, excavate and remove all of said coal .... " On a demurrer
to a declaration setting out the terms of the deed, the question
presented was whether by the language in the instrument, intrin-
sicaly interpreted, the grantor had relinquished his right of sub-
jacent support. The court, in holding that the grantor had re-
linquished this right, said :"'
"In the case at bar there is no ambiguity in the language,
and taking the words used in their common acceptation they
have but one meaning, and therefore there is no room for
construction."
6i At p. 628.
eo 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24 (1905).
61 At p. 495.
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Judge Poffenbarger vigorously and forcefully dissented. The
apparent holding in the Griffin case is contra to the conclusion
reached by practically all courts, American and English, that have
passed on the question 2 and is, it is believed, bottomed on an
untenable theory, a theory, moreover, which is expressly repu-
diated by the Restatement.8 3 And yet there is an angle to the
Griffin case which perhaps makes the actual holding fit into the
modern rule, for no extrinsic evidence was offered to show that
the words in the deed should be interpreted in any other than
their normal meaning, and even under the modern rule, as the
Restatement puts it, 4 "The ordinary meaning of language
throughout the country is given to words unless circumstances
show that a different meaning is applicable." The case therefore
does not hold that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to disturb
the normal meaning of the language, for that question was not
before the court. The case, as presented, called for intrinsic inter-
pretation alone, and therefore, strictly speaking, from the angle
of construction alone stands only for the proposition that in the
absence of evidence showing that a different meaning is ap-
plicable, the language used must be given its normal meaning -
a perfectly sound rule of law. It is not beyond the realm of
possibility that the case was lost because of the way in which the
question was presented to the court. At any rate, in a later case
where the language was only slightly different, the West Virginia
court reached a contrary conclusion."
There is a caveat, however, more significant to-day, it is be-
lieved, than the apparent holding in the Griffin case, and that is
the doctrine that the judicial interpretation put upon particular
words may become a so-called "rule of property", so that such
interpretation, even though originally erroneous, should not be
disturbed for the very cogent reason that in such situations the
social interest in the security of transactions outweighs the con-
flicting individual and social interest in the just decision of partic-
62 See, discussing some of the cases, Poffenbarger, J. dissenting in the Griffin
case. See also, discussing the question, Comment (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 358
and Caveat (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 359, by Robert T. Donley.
63 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 235, 242 and Comments.
(4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 235.
05 Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 108 S. B. 491 (1921). Here
there was a conveyance of "the coal and all minerals ... " and the grant of
"the right of mining and removing the said coal and all minerals from said
land." The court distinguished the Griffin case, and quite correctly, for it is
not possible to say that the ordinary meaning of such language throughout the
country would be that a relinquishment of the right of subjacent support was
intended.
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ular cases. Accordingly, when the question in the Griffin case
arose for the second tinie, twenty-eight years later, in Simmers v.
Star CoaZ & Coke Company,6 the West Virginia court unhesitat-
ingly followed the interpretation adopted in the Griffin case, say-
iag, among other things, that that interpretation had become a
"rule of property".6 7  In other words, in the language of the
Restatement, 8 the standard of interpretation otherwise applicable
may be "excluded by a rule of law establishing a definite mean-
ing." So a court may feel constrained to hold, as a West Virginia
court has held, 9 that after a word has received a definite legis-
lative interpretation supposedly applicable to all transactions,
that interpretation must be accepted even in the face of a general
custom giving the word a different meaning.70 But quite different
considerations applied when the question of interpretation arose
in the Griffin case, and in the light of the latest adjudication of
the West Virginia court in point it is believed that if the question
were res integra to-day the court, if proper evidence were offered
in the case, would probably reach a contrary conclusion.71
The recent decision which throws considerable doubt upon
the purported doctrine of the Griffin case is Hodge v. Garton,2
decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on
November 12, 1935. In that case there was a written contract
which contained words purporting to sell "all mining posts that
the party of the first part has made and now has on hands." The
party of the first part (the plaintiff) had made and had on hand
mining posts in six different localities. But the defendant, in
support of his claim that the contract was confined to posts in two
of these localities, offered evidence (1) that prior to the execution
of the contract the plaintiff had taken the defendant to those two
localities (Nickelville and Huddleston farm) to look over the posts
and (2) that at the time of the execution of the contract the de-
fendant gave the plaintiff a check for $500 as part payment, and
that on this check there was the notation: "$500 payment on mine
props at Nickelville and Huddleston farm."
66 113 W. Va. 309, 167 S. E. 737 (W. Va. 1933).
67 At p. 313. The court also purports to adopt the rule of construction laid
down in the Griffin case.
68 RESTATEMENT, CONmAers § 230.
69 Buchanan v. Louisville 0. & C. Co., 98 W. Va. 470, 127 S. E. 335 (1925).
70 As to whether the court was justified in arriving at that conclusion under
the particular fact situation, see comments on the case in (1925) 39 HARv. L.
REv. 212 and (1925) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 76.
71 But see the language of the court in the Simmers case, supra n. 66.
72182 S. E. 582 (W. Va. 1935).
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Is this contract "ambiguous"? The court apparently treated
it as such, and accordingly not only admitted the evidence but
held that the words "all .... posts that the party .... now has"
on hand did not include all the posts he had on hand, but only a
part. The Garten case stands in striking contrast to the Griffin
case, in which the court purported to hold that the word "all"
can have "but one meaning" - that it cannot mean "a part".
Moreover, the Garten case, by not citing the Griffin case, in fact
by citing only one case and not even quoting from that, has dealt
a staggering blow to formalism in matters of interpretation. Said
the court:" "While a more comprehensive word cannot be found
in the English language, 'all' has its limitations."
So "all" may not mean all, after all! The most comprehensive
word in our language no longer has, in the eye of the law, any
"plain meaning". Words are flexible indices of thought, not
fixed symbols, in law as well as in reality.7 It would seem there-
fore that there is no longer any excuse for talking in terms of the
vacuous ambiguity rule. There is not a word in the court's latest
opinion about it. True, the court, partly perhaps by force of
habit, pauses briefly in the syllabus to pay its respects to the past.
It is scant respect, however: "Extrinsic evidence is admissible to
explain an ambiguity appearing on the face of a contract." Am-
biguity - but all is ambiguity, saith the law.
And so the law moves along, or tends to move along, from a
primitive formalism to a practical rationalism, 5 adding new con-
tent to old precepts, evolving new precepts, new technique,, to the
extent that such change will best secure what is understood by the
courts to be the needs of the times.
To be sure, the periphery of the old rule is still with us to a
degree. But the growth of the law, like all growth, is by and large
from within. Courts do and must evolve new rules and other
legal elements to be used in deciding cases, "but they can do so
only interstitially", as one eminent judge has put it,76 - an ex-
ample of mild meiosis of course, but none the less candor itself
compared with much of the cutaneous matter beneath which courts,
in conscious or unconscious effort to secure the social interest in
stability, are wont to imbed the sum and substance of change.
73 At p. 584.
74 The writer does not mean to predict that hereafter all cases will so hold.
But the correct rule, as evidenced by the better cases and particularly by the
latest West Virginia case, justifies the statement.
75 Cf. Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L.Q. 163.
76 See n. 3, supra.
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